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Stacked 
Peck 
The rules of the game won't let the unions win 
BY LANCE COMPA 
In the battle between American work-ers and their bosses, the negotiating tables have been turned. Employers are now enthusiasts of Federal labor 
law, while unions find themselves running 
from the Government rather than to it. 
Since 1935, when the National Labor 
Relations~Act was passed, employers have 
complained that the law gives unions spe-
cial privileges: exclusive representation 
rights, exemption from antitrust statutes, 
reinstatement rights for strikers, the ability 
to use dues for political causes,'and more. 
Business leaders have also charged that the 
agency responsible for enforcing the law, 
the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), is partial to union interests. 
The Board functioned as "a legal aid 
society and organizing arm for unions," 
one management spokesman said in 1980. 
But three years later, the man who made 
that remark, Donald L. Dotson, an attor-
ney for Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel and 
Westinghouse Electric, was named chair-
man of the NLRB by President Reagan. 
Two other Reagan appointees have joined 
Dotson on the five-member panel: Robert 
P. Hunter, formerly an aide to conserva-
tive Senator Orrin Hatch, and Patricia Diaz 
Dennis, another management attorney. 
The Board has had Republican or 
Democratic majorities in the past, but 
shifts in power changed only the tilt, not 
the direction, of labor law enforcement. 
Though unions grumbled about many 
NLRB decisions, organized labor gener-
ally conceded that the Board tried to steer 
a middle course. The Reagan appointees, 
however, have put the agency on a right-
wing bearing. 
In a series of recent rulings that over-
turned established policy, the Board: 
H Determined that an employee fired 
for objecting to safety hazards had no legal 
recourse because he acted on his own, 
whereas the law requires "concerted activ-
ity" to invoke its protections. Under past 
Lance Compa is a lawyer for the United 
Electrical Workers in Washington, D.C. 
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policy, such individual protests were shel-
tered when the welfare of other workers 
was in question. 
11 Decided that an employer can agree 
to a union contract, then ask for mid-con-
tract wage cuts, and, if the the union de-
murs, transfer work to another location. 
H Expanded the power of employers to 
deny reinstatement to strikers charged with 
picket-line misconduct. Past policy al-
lowed reinstatement where verbal threats 
but no violence took place, and the Board 
also took into account the gravity of unfair 
labor practices that provoked a strike. The 
Reagan majority eliminated these consid-
erations, making it easier to fire the most 
active, militant pickets. 
11 Held that an employer has no obli-
gation to bargain over the transfer of jobs 
out of an organized plant. The NLRB said 
that management decisions "at the core of 
entrepreneurial control" need not be ne-
gotiated. ; 
11 Ruled that an employer may inter-
rogate active union supporters—a practice 
that must be avoided with passive union 
supporters or undecided workers. 
11 Said employers would not be com-
pelled to bargain even if they committed 
massive unfair labor practices—firing or-
ganizers, threatening to close the plant, 
cutting pay of union backers—to prevent 
the union from signing up a majority of 
workers. In the past, the NLRB could issue 
a bargaining order when a union drive was 
derailed by such employer misconduct. 
Not surprisingly, the Board's anti-union 
activism is drawing fire. "The underlying 
consensus Congress recognized as neces-
sary for collective bargaining to succeed 
appears to be crumbling," says Represen-
tative William L. Clay, the Missouri Dem-
ocrat who heads the House subcommittee 
on labor-management relations. 
Federal labor law "has become an al-
batross on the labor movement," United 
Mine Workers President Richard L. 
Trumka told a recent hearing of the sub-
committee. 
"We might be better off with the law 
and the Board scrapped," declared United 
Electrical Workers President James M. 
Kane, "and take our chances with the law 
of the jungle—it cannot get any worse." 
Kane and William H. Wynn, president of 
the United Food and Commercial Work-
ers, said their unions are again resorting 
to recognition strikes to secure bargaining 
rights, instead of relying on the delay-rid-
den NLRB election procedure. 
"Let us go hand to hand," AFL-CIO 
President Lane Kirkland said last August, 
adding that labor law is a "dead letter.'* 
any blame the current crisis on 
President Reagan and his ap-
pointees to the NLRB, but la-
bor's difficulties were already 
acute when Reagan took office. Decertifi-
cation elections to oust incumbent unions 
rose from about 200 per year in the 1950s 
and 1960s to almost 900 per year by the 
end of the 1970s. * 
By then, the trickle of plant closings and 
product-line transfers had become a tor-
rent, and a new breed of union-busting 
consultants was helping to thwart organ-
izing drives. In the 1950s, unions repre-
sented a solid one-third of the work force; 
by 1980, they spoke for a shaky one-fifth. 
At the center of labor's problems is not 
the Reagan NLRB, but the Taft-Hartley 
Act of 1947. Even a pro-labor Board would 
be hamstrung by that law's antilabor biases. 
"Repeal Taft-Hartley," once a powerful 
rallying cry in the labor movement, today 
sounds as compelling as "Who Lost 
China?" And yet Taft-Hartley established 
the legal structure that has squeezed or-
ganized labor into its present tight spot 
Business Week, hardly a friend of the 
unions, foresaw the process in a 1948 ed-
itorial: The Taft-Hartley Act, the maga-
zine said, "went too far. . . . Given a few 
million unemployed in America, given an 
Administration in Washington which was 
not pro-union-and the Taft-Hartley Ac* 
conceivably could wreck the labor move-
ment." 
The Taft-Hartley amendments came a 
dozen years after the Wagner Act, tn 
monumental breakthrough for the Ame 
ican labor movement. Until Senator K° 
ert Wagner of New York won appr°val 
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To force reform of labor law, 
unions must wage a new round 
of strikes and organizing drives 
his National Labor Relations Act, workers 
had no legal protection for collective ac-
tion. Employers could refuse to bargain, 
refuse to sign an agreement after bargain-
ing, and carry out reprisals against organ-
izers. The only recourse for workers was 
the strike—to obtain recognition, to com-
pel bargaining, to reinstate fired leaders, 
and to win a written agreement. 
Wagner changed that. His act's pivotal 
Section 7 rang out new freedoms: "Em-
ployees shall have the right to self-orga-
nization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection." The 
NLRB was charged with "encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining." Employers could no longer re-
taliate against workers trying to organize; 
the NLRB would conduct secret-ballot 
elections to determine majority sentiment. 
If a majority of employees chose union 
representation, the employer had to bar-
gain in good faith toward a contract. 
Millions of workers flocked to the new 
unions in the Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, as well as to the older Amer-
ican Federation of Labor unions. Organ-
ized labor's ranks more than tripled 
between 1935 and 1945, from fewer than 
four million to almost fourteen million 
members. 
But employers, backed by the courts, 
mounted an assault on the Wagner Act af-
ter World War II. Red-baiting attacks on 
CIO unions prepared public opinion for a 
management offensive. And militant CIO 
strikes in 1946—spurred by a high rate of 
inflation and disclosures of war-time prof-
iteering—provided ammunition for accu-
sations that unions had become "Big La-
bor," rivaling the power of "Big Business." 
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act put a "right 
to refrain" from union activity on a par 
with the right to organize and bargain. In 
its key section, 8(c), the Taft-Hartley Act 
codified antilabor court decisions allowing 
employers to launch workplace campaigns 
against unionization. 
Taft-Hartley also gave the President au-
thority to obtain strikebreaking injunc-
tions; established a new class of union un-
fair labor practices; permitted states where 
employers maintained a tight grip on gov-
ernment to enact "right-to-work" laws; 
outlawed solidarity job actions; allowed 
strikebreakers to vote in NLRB-run elec-
tions; let workers bypass union represen-
tation to take up grievances individually, 
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and required loyalty oaths from elected 
union officials—a provision later revoked, 
but not before it was used to sow divisions 
in the labor movement. 
Labor's desire to repeal Taft-Hartley was stifled by the Cold War and by steady economic expansion that lulled the movement into a false 
sense of security. But in the 1970s, the 
economy stopped expanding, and the la-
bor-management entente came to an end. 
By 1977, the unions felt an urgent need for 
a revised labor law. Their reform bill was 
a modest effort to correct some of the worst 
aspects of Taft-Hartley. 
The unions, cognizant that Democrats 
controlled both Congress and the White 
House, saw a golden opportunity. "Noth-
ing is more important to the labor move-
ment at this point in its history—nothing!" 
declared George Meany, then president of 
the AFL-CIO. 
The corporations agreed, and employer 
lobbyists pulled out all the stops to oppose 
the bill. Though it passed the House of 
Representatives, the Labor Reform mea-
sure died in a Senate filibuster in 1978. 
Stung by this defeat, the AFL-CIO pleaded 
with employers to hold up their end of the 
postwar deal: In an "open letter to the wise 
and intelligent leaders of the American 
business community," Meany begged, "Do 
you want to destroy American trade 
unionism? Do you secretly seek a death 
sentence for the collective bargaining sys-
tem you so often hail in public forums?" 
In fact, business leaders have stepped 
up their assault on unions since the late 
1970s. And the Reagan NLRB, seen in 
context, is merely carrying out the anti-
labor program that has always been im-
plicit in the Taft-Hartley Act. 
The unions, pursuing the strategy that 
failed in 1978, hope the election of Walter 
Mondale and a Democratic Senate will lead 
to enactment of a new labor reform bill in 
1985. But a Mondale victory is not likely 
to change either the antilabor attitude of 
employers or the long-term economic and 
social trends that are1 undermining the la-
bor movement. To remove the legal ob-
stacles to organizing, trade unionists will 
have to recall significant lessons of the 
Wagner Act period. 
Important as it was, the Wagner Act did 
not in itself liberate workers to begin or-
ganizing in the 1930s. Though the Act was 
approved in 1935, it did not take effect— 
and the newly created NLRB did not func-
tion—until the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the measure in 1937. 
%. 
k * 
By that time, workers had already carried \ 
out a nationwide textile strike in 1933, • 
general strikes in San Francisco and Min? 
neapolis in 1934, sit-down strikes in Ak-
ron and Toledo in 1935, the formation of Ft'. 
the CIO in 1936, and the 1936-1937 Flint 
sit-down action that organized General 
Motors. 
The Wagner Act and the Supreme fir 
Court's decision to uphold it actually rat-
ified freedoms that millions of Americans 
had already claimed in the shops, on the 
picket lines, and in the streets. Progressive 
members of Congress voted for the bill out j^>-
of conviction, but others, like Franklin 
Roosevelt and the Supreme Court major-
ity, were moved by a fear of uncontrolled 
industrial strife. The strikes and sit-ins 
meant that employers could not go to sleep 
certain that their workers would show up 
in the morning. The purpose of the Wag-
ner Act was to restore stability to a shaken 
system of labor relations. 
Still, the Wagner Act cannot be dis-
missed as a sop to workers. It emboldened 
employees with the feeling that the Federal 
Government was on their side. It enabled 
the CIO to engage in large-scale organiz-
ing. Tough enforcement by the NLRB 
helped workers overcome the resistance of 
such holdout employers as the Ford Motor 
Company and Westinghouse Electric. In 
short, pro-labor laws encouraged organ-
izing, bargaining, and political action, but 
it took aggressive organizing, bargaining, 
and political action to win pro-labor laws. 
In today's political and economic cli-
mate, unions cannot sit still and wait for 
the pendulum to swing back. To force re-
form of labor law—and it will have to be 
forced even if Mondale wins the Presi-
dency—labor must wage a new round of 
recognition strikes, solidarity actions, city-
wide general strikes, and community or-
ganizing. Labor must couple these actions 
with such innovative techniques as cor-
porate campaigns, union control of pen-
sion funds, and public relations offensives. 
Whenever unions have seemed to-be 
down, American workers have fought back 
with a burst of militant organizing—froD1 
the Knights of Labor in the late Nine-
teenth Century to the Wobblies in the early 
Twentieth Century and the CIO in: the 
1930s. The labor movement moves fo** 
c 
ward in spurts, not at a steady pace. _ 
The breakdown of labor law and the 
current spate of unrelenting employer at-
tacks could generate a new outpouring ° 
class-conscious unionism. That, in tuffc 
would constitute the best lobby for lab° 
law reform. M 
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